Thoughts on Friday’s Referenda: What is a Family?
“You shouldn’t hate your body, it’s part of you,
You shouldn’t hate your family, it’s part of you,
You shouldn’t hate your neighbours cause they’re part of you!
Black walls,
Black walls.” - ‘Black Walls’, Pavement.
The Arguments Advanced by the ‘No’ Side.
The proposed amendments to the constitution, which will be subject to referenda on Friday (08.03.2024), have been critiqued on a variety of grounds and from multiple vantage points across the political spectrum.
Senator Michael McDowell, among others, has pointed to the patent ambiguity of the wording, specifically the interpolation of the words ‘durable relationship’ into Article 41, as a glaring defect of the 39th amendment.
A further concern is that the proposed amendment will facilitate increased migration into Ireland. Reminiscent of the adverse consequences of the 19th amendment, it is feared that the 39th amendment will give constitutional footing to the conveyance, traditionally reserved to families of married couples, of “inalienable and imprescriptible rights” to non-traditional familial forms common in the third world.
Particularly worrying is the prospect of polygamous migrants, in receipt of free legal aid and a plethora of other benefits courtesy of NGOs, bringing a challenge to the Supreme Court based on the new constitutional regime.
Notwithstanding the intrinsic immorality of polygamy, buttressing it with constitutional protection risks increasing the number of migrants arriving into Ireland – Neale Richmond conceded that the expansion of the scope of Article 41 will facilitate family reunification.
Senator McDowell’s sentiment was echoed by politicians on the political left, including Ivana Bacik and Holly Cairns. Bacik, who has a background as a barrister, noted the equivocal nature of the words ‘durable relationship’. Most humorously, the ever gaffe-prone Eamon Ryan provided a defence of Article 41 in 2017:
“It was originally enshrined to protect us from what were then the excessive powers of business. Some see it as reactionary but I see it as quite progressive. If we just bow down to the needs of business, we could end up destroying our society as well as our economy in the long run because economy depends on society.”
It should be noted that the aforesaid are all in favour of a ‘Yes’ vote, despite their misgivings.
Regarding amendment 40 (‘The Care Amendment’, colloquially), critics have noted that the proposal diminishes the socio-economic obligations incumbent on governments toward care-givers – disability rights activists have been especially vocal in calling for a ‘no vote’ vis-à-vis this amendment.
It awaits to be seen whether this, along with the above-explicated arguments, will carry the day for the ‘No’ side.
The Insufficiency of an Oblique Critique
Whilst the ‘No’ side has proffered meritorious arguments, it’s transparent that they were advanced in conjunction with a strategy of evasion. Put differently, the ‘No’ campaign, by and large, has eschewed addressing the opposing side’s central moral claims head-on, instead opting to critique the prospective effects of the amendment, its ambiguities, and the misrepresentation of the extant Article’s meaning.
The central claims of the ‘Yes’ side, with respect to both amendments, are that the recognition of a woman’s role in the home is anachronistic, if not misogynistic, and that the family based on marriage is overly-restrictive, and thus the scope of familial forms subject to the protections of Article 41 ought to be expanded.
Both arguments dovetail in their rejection of the heterosexual, married family as the quintessence of what it means to be a family unit.
The slippery disposition of the ‘No’ side perhaps bought them votes for the referendum via alliance building with unlikely allies. But at what cost? To view Friday’s referenda discretely would be facile; it’s the expression of the same liberalising current that precipitated the Divorce, Gay Marriage, and Abortion referenda.
In conjunction with referendum-specific arguments, we ought to construct – considering the robustness of the intellectual traditions we’ve inherited, construction need not be conflated with contrivance – a model of familial life which lends itself, in an affirmative and bold fashion, to its presentation before the Irish people as an alternative to the sterile, incoherent, and diluted model of family life advanced by our enemies.
What Distinguishes the Heterosexual Family Model?
In a world where convention dictates that defective and degenerate social arrangements constitute bona fide families, the most pressing question is: what is the family? Alternatively, what ought it to be? For one can concomitantly affirm that there is an ideal type of family whilst conceding that there are gradations, viz. forms which, whilst not ideal families, contain properties of, or approximate, family life.
The socio-economic obligations owed and rights ascribed to the family are at a cost to the Irish taxpayer, inherently. Moreover, the conveyance of rights to a group or individual engenders inequality between the rights-bearer and other subjects outside the constitution’s protective remit. This should be kept in mind when evaluating whether a social arrangement ought to meet the threshold to be considered a family.
We must ask ourselves: on balance, in consideration of the cost it imposes, is it warranted to constitutionally privilege X social form? In the case of a heterosexual union bound by marriage, the answer is a resounding yes.
The heterosexual family, married or un-married, is chiefly distinguished from other social arrangements by its ability to produce children. Non-heterosexual “families”, such as those founded upon same-sex relations, lack this quality; at most, being un-generative inherently, they can adopt already extant children or use IVF to generate them – in either case, the couple in question’s ability to have children is contingent on natural heterosexual generation or an extraneous scientific procedure.
Exceptions to the Rule Do Not Quash the Rule: The Central Case Method
We’ve established that there is an ineluctable inequality between heterosexual couples and non-heterosexual couples vis-à-vis fertility. Pedants will inevitably object: “What about infertile heterosexual families? Will you deprive them of the same rights conferred to fecund heterosexual couples?”.
If one was to accede to this critique, the implication for everyday categories we take for granted would be immense. The innocuous statements, being two-legged is a property of men and elephants have two eyes, would be equally fallacious per the above logic, for there are always exceptions that defy a category’s parameters.
When the above statements are altered to say: being three-legged is a property of men and elephants have 3 eyes, the result is absurd. And justifiably so. For men have two legs and elephants have 2 eyes, in spite of the fact that some men deviate from the focal category due to, say, having three eyes.
Or as the Australian jurist and philosopher, John Finnis, contends, categories have central and secondary cases; the very act of considering whether a thing belongs to a category implies a pre-existing conception of what that category is.
This pre-existing conception is a central case, or the standard version of a category, – returning to our previous example: humans with two eyes – by which one can adjudicate the suitability of including something as part of a category.
Depending on the thing’s properties, it may fall into one of three types: the central case (indistinguishable from the standard version), the secondary case (akin to the central case, but less proximate due to it possessing dissimilar properties i.e an elephant with three eyes), and discretely falling outside the category (self-explanatory).
In relation to a family based on a heterosexual union, the central case would encompass its capacity to have children. A heterosexual union that was infertile, and in turn chose to adopt as a consequence, would nevertheless fall into the category of a heterosexual union, albeit as a secondary case given it lacks the property of fertility.
But the question remains: how do we arrive at a central case? Returning to Finnis, he was insistent that categories should not be predicated on isolating a variable consistent to all conventionally deemed members of a category; formulating a definition which takes the lowest common denominator as its sine qua non engenders categories that suffer from descriptive poverty – that is, terms which don’t really tell us about the object they are describing.
Pursuant to his commitment to the natural law tradition, Finnis posited that categorisation entailed making a moral valuation regarding what a category ought to be. Finnis was writing within the domain of jurisprudence, and his viewpoint was controversial in light of the prevailing positivist position that there ought to be a clear distinction between descriptions of law and our evaluation of them.
Whether there is veracity to Finnis’ position is beyond the scope of the essay. For the purposes of the constitution, the common good is a core consideration. And in articulating a constitutional definition of the family, it must be abided by. Constitutional definitions are necessarily impinged upon by evaluative considerations.
So, in light of this, what should the central case of the family be?
The Central Case: The Heterosexual Family Model
To reiterate, the heterosexual family unit is the only association capable of generating children. At scale, it accounts for almost all births. And despite predictions that artificial wombs will be operable in the future, there is currently no alternative bar IVF, which is irrelevant at scale.
Given its generative properties and the fact that it accounts for virtually all births, the family form responsible for the continuation of our nation ought to have constitutional recognition, protection, esteem, and privilege due to the role it plays. A role unparalleled by parasitic associations, such as homosexual unions.
If sustaining the replenishment of our nation is an aim worth pursuing, then we must not establish parity between homosexual and heterosexual unions. The former are sterile by design, the latter by accident.
Ireland’s birth rate has declined significantly over the past decade. It’s time to waive with childish, tokenistic, and degenerative liberalising measures, and in their place declare our dedication to the revival and flourishment of authentic families. The family is the nucleus from which nations grow and sustain themselves. If Ireland is to survive, we must be committed to its protection.
Fecundity is not the only pertinent factor. Heterosexual parents typically have a biological relationship with their children. Thus, on average, the familial bond is stronger; children are less likely to suffer from an identity crisis given the 1:1 relationship between their parents’ legal and natural status vis-à-vis them. Child abuse, sexual and otherwise, is far lower among heterosexuals than homosexuals. Furthermore, adopted children and fostered children are more likely to be abused than those domiciled with their biological parents.
I’ve addressed the question of infertile heterosexual couples above, but for those unconvinced, even if infertile heterosexual families pose an ultimately unreconcilable quandary for social conservatives, – to be clear, I don’t believe this to be the case – on balance is it worth tearing down the position of the only naturally generative association for the sake of consistency? I don’t believe it is, and I believe such a measure runs contrary to the common good.
The Central Case: The Importance of Marriage
Whilst heterosexuality is a core feature of the central case of what a constitutionally protected family ought to be, it is not the only facet. Monogamous marriage is the other core pillar.
Marriage, true marriage, forges an ineluctable bond between men and women. The cancer of divorce lies in quashing its most important quality: endurance in the face of whim, interest, and desire. Marriage should not be understood absent a telos. If the creation of future generations be the object of family life, marriage is the stabilising means whereby the former goal can be optimally achieved.
Monogamous marriage is a civilising agent in human history. By transmuting man and woman as husband and wife, marriage tethers their destinies, in turn curbing the male impulse for violence, deviance, and irresponsibility.
Rather than permit a man to abscond from his duty toward his wife and child, marriage reinforces his obligations. The male, now a father and husband, finds himself devoid of youth’s apathy, and instead has a direct and tangible interest in the future and wellbeing of his society, due to its impact on his child’s life. The sublimation of male violence, a destructive force if improperly channelled, toward conservative, pro-social, and protective ends, is one of the great achievements of monogamous marriage.
For women, monogamous marriage offers a safe framework within which to give birth and raise children. Absent divorce, marriage ensures that the husband is obliged to stick by his wife at her weakest period: pregnancy. Family life accords with women’s nature, by facilitating their desire to give birth to and nurture their children; women’s romantic impulse, too, is satiated by marriage; their suppressed desire to live out the male-female social dynamic, in which woman finds herself in a state of protection, is satisfied by the marital bond.
Bereft of the bond of marriage, women find themselves, in their mature years, in either a state of unhappiness, because they lack children and a constant male bond, or in a position of socio-economic deprivation due to single motherhood. The latter outcome has ill-effects on the children of such an arrangement – across the board, the children of married families have better life outcomes.
Whilst there are exceptions to my illustration of married life, in general they’re accurate. And when dealing with a question at scale, generalisation is what matters.
The Central Case: Against Polygamy, for Monogamy
A successful ‘Yes’ vote spells the potential to legalise polygamy. On foot of new constitutional regime, suitable conditions are created for a case to be brought to the Supreme Court arguing that bigamy constitutes a durable relationship, and thus is owed protection under Article 41.
Therefore, it’s important to outline why polygamy is wrong. From a Christian perspective, the answer is obvious. However, MEON’s readership undoubtedly comprises many faiths, and in the interest of convincing the greatest number of people, my argument in this section is secular.
From a perspective that values national harmony, polygamy is a disaster. By delimiting the number of wives one can have to one, Monogamy acts as a de facto redistributor of the means of sexual reproduction among men. Polygamy is the inversion of this; it permits men to have multiple wives, to the detriment of other men who resultingly have none.
Compounded by female hypergamy, this leads to a society of, frankly, pissed off men – although an incel uprising is fantastical, the dissatisfaction, sexual tension, and resent caused may sublimate into a politically subversive movement. There was genuine anxiety among the upper stratum of Japan in the 1930s that the imbalance of men and women would catalyse revolutionary movements at home, and it was hoped that imperialism, by introducing Japanese soldiers to foreign women, would be its panacea.
Furthermore, unlike a monogamous society, wherein inceldom plagues the defective, in a polygamous society, due to the shrinking pool of women, it would impact otherwise functional and normal males; its purportedly “eugenic” affect would be mitigated.
Conclusion
The Constitution is committed to furthering the common good. Consequently, in relation to family matters, it should protect and privilege the family form from which life derives, and thus a nation’s future; the family form which accords with male and female nature, whilst restraining their excesses; the family form which has the best predictive outcome for children; the family form that ensures harmony, high time-preference thinking, and fidelity.
That family form is the family based on heterosexual marriage, and I implore you to vote No on Friday to both referenda for its sake, and thus for the sake of Ireland.