Hungary and the New Concert of Europe: A Review of Balázs Orbán’s Hussar Cut: The Hungarian Strategy for Connectivity
“‘The international system of the twenty-first century will be marked by a seeming contradiction: on the one hand, fragmentation; on the other, growing globalization. On the level of the relations among states, the new order will be more like the European state system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than the rigid patterns of the Cold War. It will contain at least six major powers – the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India – as well as a multiplicity of medium-sized and smaller countries. At the same time, international relations have become truly global for the first time. Communications are instantaneous; the world economy operates on all continents simultaneously. A whole set of issues has surfaced that can only be dealt with on a worldwide basis, such as nuclear proliferation, the environment, the population explosion, and economic interdependence.” — Henry Kissinger
“A new game is beginning, and there are so many unknown factors that the outcome of the game is unpredictable. The whole world is looking on with fear and anxiety at this growing disorder, and speculating about what may come next. By waiting patiently or failing to act, individual countries essentially subordinate their own destiny to the machinations of the great powers. Smaller nations that want to take their destiny into their own hands have no choice but to face matters with boldness and creativity.” — Balázs Orbán
Amidst the incontinence of European politics and a dearth of sober political analysis, Balázs Orbán’s book emerges as a lucid and articulate vision for the future of Europe, modelled along Hungarian strategic thought. Balázs Orbán is a prominent figure in Hungarian politics, serving as the Political Director of the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and as a member of the Hungarian National Assembly. Published this year by the publishing house of the Hungarian institute for higher learning, Mathias Corvinus Collegium, Orbán’s writings serve as an essential how to? guide for modern foreign policy.
The central thesis of Orbán’s book posits the idea of economic and diplomatic connectivity as the foremost reliable international political strategy in the multipolar era. Lending its title from the famed military tradition of the Hungarian hussars, Orbán frames contemporary European foreign policies as lacklustre, deluded, and in need of a decisive opportunistic gambit.
“If there is a single motif that best encapsulates the hussar ethos, the essence of hussar virtues, it is the so-called hussar cut. One dictionary of the Hungarian language defines it as follows: “A fast, decisive, surprising, and at the same time reckless enterprise; an initiative or action that risks everything.” The hussar’s success depends on whether there is an opportunity for a hussar cut. If not, superior force and the fortunes of battle will eventually grind him down. But if it is possible, then – despite all rational calculations, military conventions, or numerical superiority on the opposing side – the hussar will surely win and his opponents lose.” — Balázs Orbán
Contra to the policies of derisking, detachment, and decoupling from the international economy formulated in Washington D.C. and Brussels, Balázs Orbán envisions a foreign policy which maximises its interconnection to global market forces and international political economy, while remaining true to conservative principles of cultural nationalism and political sovereignty. The policy envisioned by Orbán is however no fairy-tale dream, but rather the existing foreign policy of the Hungarian state.
Hungary in a Changing World
Globalisation is the prevailing inter-state force in the contemporary system, as states are compelled to greater interdependence in economic, technological, and political levels through international institutions and bilateral relationships. As Francis Fukuyama is largely the brunt of every foreign policy joke of the twenty-first century, so has the European Right, embodied a tendency to condemn globalisation and its excesses – intrinsically linking this to the consequences of mass replacement immigration and the subsequent threat facing European national identities.
Against such logical fallacies, Balázs Orbán, issues a politically sober clarification: globalisation is a natural process built upon the climax of centuries of economic, technological, and industrial innovations. Global economic interdependence is a reality of the world in which we live, and it is an area in which the European Right cannot afford folly.
Neoliberalism is the economic and government policies introduced with a systems of ideological commitments which became the dominant ethos of the political establishment following the collapse of the U.S.S.R and the coming of the Pax Americana – under which the continued model for globalisation became the neoliberal form – mirroring that of the system of the then unipolar United States.
Understanding then, the growing pains of the current world order, Orbán’s assessment of Hungarian aspirations is contextualised by speculated future scenarios and the construction of strategy which may allow both flexibility and independence when needed.
The scenarios considered are:
1) The maintenance of the status quo under U.S. hegemony.
2) The creation of a new unipolar hegemon, likely being the People’s Republic of China.
3) The creation a bipolar system, between the U.S. and China.
4) A multipolar system in which multiple states vie for power and influence in their respective regions.
5) A chaotic system, in which should multipolarity fail to create a balance-of-power, international institutions and stability will experience a continuing breakdown – fostering diplomatic isolation and hostility between states.
In all of the above scenarios, Hungary’s national interests, and foreign policy considerations remain the same. It is with this understanding, that the Hungarian strategy of connectivity has been constructed. As Balázs Orbán writes: “We want to become a strong, developed country, decisively and under our own steam, but to get there we must travel the world, and experience what it has to offer.”
Central to the development of Hungarian strength on the international stage are its aspirations to become a regional Middle Power. An increasingly tangible status, and one which some would has already achieved. As a Middle Power, Hungary envisions itself as a key actor in Central European economic and political activities, with a responsibility to encourage infrastructure development in the region. Taking on such a leading role in creating a political consensus at the heart of continental Europe boosts Hungary’s economic and political profile as a Middle Power – and may act as a springboard for connectivity with nations further afield in Central Asia.
As the challenges of the coming century emerge and consolidate themselves in ever higher difficulties, Hungary resolutely affirms its position in the European Union and as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. Recognising that Hungary cannot face the world alone is a central component of the strategy of connectivity – and while remaining faithful to her European allies, Hungary further engages in shared economic partnerships with China for the sake not merely of Hungarian national interests, but to serve as an example to Europe, that mixed-source Foreign Direct Investment is far more stable than requesting lines of credit from Washington or Brussels.
As written by Hungarian diplomat Levente Benkő in the Hungarian Conservative,
“Western institutions that used to be the heartbeat of the world are no longer impossible to circumvent today. Even as decoupling does cause headaches to the system’s detractors, attempts to enforce the dogma of internationalism at all costs whereby the West loses ground. If this be the master plan of the United States, the only serious achievement it has to show for itself thus far is to have brought Europe to its knees.”
Scholars of Chinese foreign policy recognise the provision of exit-options for sympathetic states, disgruntled with the Western-led world order, as a central component of China’s growing global influence. One must consider it a fundamental failure of Western foreign policy to have allowed Russia and Iran to become pariah states – who when excluded from the increasingly ideological nature of the international liberal order – are eager to work with the pragmatic and amoral Chinese government. It was this failure of the Western order which allowed the creation of BRICs, which now threatens the U.S. dollar’s dominance as the world’s reserve currency.
Consequently, Europe stands without exit-options of its own. Institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union cement our role within the Western world order – no matter how dissatisfied with it we may be. Within this context, the strategy of connectivity offers the only alternative European states may employ to realistically alter the status quo and mitigate the damage done to our international influence.
Far from isolationist, the Hungarian example reiterates a sobering reality that the West is slow to cop – the coming distribution of the balance of power is unstable and any stability and the safeguarding of European interests – economic or civilizational – must come about through connectivity. Global economics – much to the chagrin of the simple and close-minded – cannot be returned to its original form – pandoras box has been opened and we are merely living in an era in which these are the facts of life – that economic failures in China, Japan, the U.S., India, and even the growth of African economies – will impact Europe as equally as civil strike on our own continent.
The twenty-first century has must reconcile itself to the vast projected economic growth for African economies, coupled with the continent’s natural resource capacity; the continued centralisation of international finance and trade in the Arab world; a Chinese-dominated Pacific region; an ever declining United States.
The multipolar world order spells the death knell of American exceptionalism, as foreign policy professionals in the United States are confronted with a stark decision – acquiesce to Chinese geopolitical demands in the East and accept that the United States is merely an infantile state on the world stage of equal repute as any other – or remain headstrong and tarnish the remnants of Western influence in a grand conflict over an island semi-conductor manufacturer. The United States far from an perennial ally of Europe, is rather a some-times, and extremely conditional, guarantor
Lessons for Ireland
Ireland, as a small nation – must mimic Hungary for it is an essential strategy for us to secure our interests. Though Ireland, owing to its geography cannot avail of the same strategy as Hungary, we must accept and embrace our position on the periphery of Europe.
To become a Peripheral Power would be a substantial task – and yet it is the only opportunity for Ireland to subsist as a nation is of its own right. By the term Peripheral Power, it must be clarified that we are under no illusion that Ireland may become a major player on the global stage, but rather, by commanding respect from neighbouring nations and remaining assertive of our economic and diplomatic interests.
Our nearest geographical neighbours are on the other side of the Irish Sea – The United Kingdom, a hereditary enemy of Ireland whose malicious policy deceits against our country continue to this day, to the South, France, our closest European Union neighbour – further to the South we find Spain and Portugal. In the periphery, we remain near to Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Iceland. Across the Atlantic – the United States and Canada. To say we are geographically isolated in our diplomatic relations is an understatement. At the centre of the West, Ireland is unmistakably limited by the scope of its potential use of Hungary’s strategy of economic connectivity.
For Ireland, a nation overly reliant on FDI from American companies, tech companies, the question is: how do we diversify our economy and increase Irish connectivity? Ireland would be an ideal place for such a policy to be employed – on the periphery of Europe and leveraging our substantial benefits as an English speaking country, in the EU, not in NATO, with a historical relationship with the United States, and with a policy of military neutrality. Some would say Ireland is indeed ideally suited to benefit from the strategy of connectivity - it may even be the only effective policy that a nation such as Ireland can follow to engage with the international system seriously. Hungary sees itself as serving the role of key-stone state in the coming world order – a middle-man of sorts between different countries in their relations.
There is no reason why the Republic of Ireland should not mimic this model – and indeed our unique history gives us reputable standing with all the nations of the world. Of the powers expected to emerge in the coming world order, Ireland has history of positive relations with them all – not withstanding the recent and abject failures of Irish foreign policy to live up to the potential our country has.
China sees Ireland as a lucrative access-point into the Western system owing to our position as an English-speaking country in the European Union, outside NATO, and as a financial and technological centre.
Russia, in spite of the Irish government’s asinine isolation of this influential country, shares a deep history with Ireland through the fate of our exiled nobility – the Wild Geese - and in recent memory Ireland’s cordial diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union.
Japan, a key player in the international economy, shares a perplexing cultural history with Ireland through the enigmatic folklorist Lafcadio Hearn – which, compounded with the noted Hibernophilia of the Japanese Royals – and our analogous strife as demilitarised island nations – brings Ireland significant repute with this far-off nation.
India, expected to be one of the pivotal players of the twenty-first century, sees Ireland as a friendly nation, and one who shares a history under British colonialism. Including the historical inspiration for India’s own independence movement originating in the successes of the Irish Free State, it is safe to say that Irish-Indian relations have a solid historical backdrop.
The United States is a natural friend to Ireland. In spite of this nation’s ailments on the international stage, and its responsibility for the quagmire now faced by European people the world over, Ireland remains a point of special regard in the hearts and minds of American leadership. This historical relationship and reception ought to be leveraged more by our government – with the necessity of folding the ministerial portfolio for the Irish diaspora into the Department of Foreign Affairs – should we wish to actually take advantage of our historical boons.
As a European nation with deep roots across the continent, Ireland’s home is within this family of nations, and is recognised in high historical regard by all nations.
African states too see us in a friendly light whether as a result of our Christian missionary work across the continent or our international aid programme.
Furthermore, through Ireland’s support for Palestine, the door is opened to greater relationships with the Global South and the Arabic-speaking world.
To list all the nations and regions of the world would be exhaustive. It has been established that the major players and regions in the international system today hold our country’s history in high regard – or are at least in theory not hostile towards our policy aims.
A Global Concert?
“Thus, in effect, none of the most important countries which must build a new world order have had any experience with the multistate system that is emerging. Never before has a new world order had to be assembled from as many different perceptions, or on so global a scale. Nor has any previous order had to combine the attributes of the historic balance-of-power systems with global democratic opinion and the exploding technology of the contemporary period.” — Henry Kissinger
“Little given to abstract ideas, we accept things as they are and we attempt to the maximum of our ability to protect ourselves against delusions about realities.” — Prince Klemens von Metternich
“The state of things in Europe is that all states depend on each other… Europe is a single state composed of several provinces.” — Montesquieu
“For a long time now, Europe has had for me the quality of a Fatherland.” — Prince Klemens von Metternich
The Concert of Europe evokes theatrical imagery at the height of European balance-of-power. Revised throughout the course of the nineteenth century, this performance of European diplomatic excellence and political grandeur came to an abrupt and violent end with the outbreak of the Great War. With the advent of the United States’ arrogant Wilsonian programme, the Concert failed to re-start, only later to be replaced by a bipolar puppet-show in the form of the Cold War.
The moving parts, mature political scheming, and aesthetic refinement of politics as the highest art form a nation might create, were lost to the world at the end of the Concert of Europe. But alas, as the United States falters in its leadership, and the multipolar era manifests, the dress rehearsal begins for a new performance of unprecedented scale.
As the dress rehearsal is called for the coming era, the nations of the world race to claim the leading role. Reneging such scuffles and distractions is where Europe’s opportunity lies – as others gamble it all on the leading role – we might position our continent to become deuteragonist.
Will European civilisation ‘go gentle into that good night’ or will we grit our teeth and face the music?
Hungary has positioned itself as the stage director for the coming recital, though it remains to be seen if Europe will continue to sing from the Wilsonian hymn sheet of the United States, or whether under the Magyar’s tutelage, we might find change abound.
The rules of international politics are being rewritten with ever increasing vagueness and uncertainty – something which the European Union’s leadership is wont to admit. Ergo, we must ask ourselves about not merely the policy paths which might lead us out of the abyss, but instead where we wish to find our nations: hiding behind the curtain or at centre stage of the coming epoch?
Awaiting a day when Cardinal Richelieu’s raison d’état will return to the European Continent once more, it is clear that Europe’s current future rests in the Hungarian Hussar’s gambit.